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much : too little, if the relation of ethics to jurisprudence is merely a relation of intimately related and closely coördinated sciences ; but too much, if he means, as he evidently does, to ground his ethics upon the foundations of jurisprudence. Again, the state whose 'soul' is the juristic person in his universal significance, Professor Cohen declares, is not to be regarded as the state historically revealed in any one particular form or place or age, but the state ideally conceived. The universal which is the life of the state is, after all, according to the author's statement, that universal which has in it a touch of the eternal, which needs the idea of God to give it constancy and authority, and whose laws are the unwritten laws that know no change. Is not this after all the true universal, the real prototype both of the juristic person and the moral person ? The relation of ethics to jurisprudence is thus the relation which arises from the possibility of a common reference to one and the same source. Moreover, in a relation which is essentially one that is coördinate and not a relation of subordination, Professor Cohen certainly overestimates the dependence of ethics upon jurisprudence, and underestimates the dependence of jurisprudence upon ethics.

On the other hand, we are in complete agreement with the author's contention that only in society can man be regarded as an ethical person, and that the only foundation for a society which has moral significance is the state. But he evidently wishes to prove a more intimate relation than that of determining the proper ethical environment, an almost mystical relation between the individual and the *Staatsseele*, and it is at this point that his system seems to feel the stress and strain of its own weight.

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Greek Thinkers : A History of Ancient Philosophy. By THEODOR GOMPERZ. Translated into English from the second German edition by G. G. BERRY. Vols. II and III. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905. — pp. xii, 397 ; vii, 386.

The first volume of the English translation of Gomperz's *Griechische Denker* was published in 1901, and was reviewed by Professor Fairbanks in the *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW* for September of the same year. Two volumes of the German work have so far been published, the first volume concluding with the Sophists, and the second volume carrying the subject through Plato. Volumes II and III of the English translation correspond with Vol. II of the German original. The

second volume (German) was published in March, 1902, and so considerable was the demand for the work that a new edition, with minor alterations, was issued in December, 1902.

The work of Gomperz belongs to a very original and extraordinary type. It could have been written only by a man rich in knowledge, of mature scholarship, and unusual temperament. When the second volume issued from the press, Gomperz was seventy years of age and Professor Emeritus at the University of Vienna. At the beginning of his career, he had trained himself for jurisprudence, but, turning aside to philology and philosophy, he at once established an enviable reputation by publishing in 1865-66 two volumes of "Herculaneum Studies," and in 1867 became privat-docent at the University of Vienna, where in 1873 he was made Professor *Ordinarius* of Classical Philology. His works cover a wide range of classical subjects, and include a translation of the works of John Stuart Mill into German. What strikes one especially, in reading the volumes on Greek philosophy now before us, is the extraordinary range from which Gomperz draws his illustrative materials. These materials are in large measure taken from modern philosophy, ethnology, anthropology, and the natural sciences of both the ancient and modern worlds. No work on Greek philosophy is comparable with that of Gomperz in the matters of illuminating illustration and apposite citation. The work to which one instinctively turns in order to compare and measure the labors of our author is Zeller's *Philosophy of the Greeks*. Here we are struck with very interesting contrasts. Both works are high types of German scholarship, and of monumental dimensions. While Gomperz by profession and training is a philologist, Zeller by profession and training is a theologian and philosopher. Yet in the two works under comparison the philologist gives us an essentially philosophical *Kulturgeschichte*, while the philosopher gives us an objective narrative of facts and data based on the sanest and most thorough philological inquiries, and his work bristles with textual annotations, emendations, and criticisms. The one is a philosophical interpreter, evaluating his facts in terms of his temperament, his knowledge, and the environing conditions of the facts; the other is the critical historian, sifting evidence with the help of philology, and systematically presenting the results as an objective quantum. The primary object of Gomperz is to illuminate, interpret, and vivify the fact; the primary object of Zeller is to authentically determine and clearly present the fact. While it is not the reviewer's present purpose to weigh and evaluate the relative advantages of these two methods, it is clear that Gomperz's method is

better for an audience in an academic lecture room or for the general reader, while Zeller's method is better for the scholar or trained specialist. And so it seems to me that the two works are adapted to two distinct classes of readers, and each has a different *raison d'être*. I do not wish to be misunderstood as indicating by the above comparison that Gomperz's work is what is commonly stigmatized as popular. It is a work of prodigious scholarship, of fine appreciative and expository qualities, of brilliant and eloquent manner, of great breadth of treatment and purview, and, by virtue of these last-named qualities, it is popular in a high and legitimate sense, *i. e.*, it is interesting to a larger body of readers than a bald, pragmatic statement would be, whose appeal is exclusively to the historical and logical faculty. Indeed, one may go further and say that the writing of a treatise that shall maintain a just balance between the claims of scholarship and the claims of literary statement, the claims of content and the claims of form, of scientific matter and interesting investiture, is the most difficult of all forms of expression, demanding as it does rare qualities of both head and heart. This method, however, as exemplified by Gomperz, suffers one great disadvantage; it pushes aside a vast mass of detail, which might impede the narrative or be excluded for lack of space. As a matter of fact, the three volumes now published in English are poor in details, when compared with Zeller's work. Consequently no one would think of going to Gomperz's treatise as a work of reference. Zeller's work, on the other hand, is a great repository of facts and data, from which neither the consulting historian nor philologist is sent empty away. The volumes of Gomperz can in no way rival the older work in this respect.

It was the intention of Gomperz to include in his second volume the later Academics and the Peripatetics, but the space was taken up by an unexpected extension of the analysis of the Platonic dialogues. If the work is continued on the present scale, it will occupy at least six volumes in the translation. Every student of ancient thought who has read these preliminary volumes, will ardently wish that the aged savant may have the strength to complete the task, which has now been brilliantly carried to the middle point.

Preliminary to his account of Socrates, the author devotes a chapter to the changes in faith and morals that took place between Homer and the Enlighteners, and another chapter to the ethico-political genius of the Athenians, exhibiting in these the external conditions that make the life, the work, and fate of Socrates intelligible. These external conditions are the persistence of a conservative popular religion,

the leaven of radicalism introduced mainly by the Sophists, the contention of political factions at the close of the fifth century, the struggle between tory and liberal, in the midst of which colliding forces Socrates was crushed. Particularly impressive is Gomperz's account of the relation of Socrates to the State, and of the occasion when he sat as prytane, where preëminently he merited the apt title (originally applied to Benjamin Franklin): "An enthusiast of Sobriety." He was the sole member of the minority and the only judge who had not succumbed to the political debauch. In this coolness of the head and warmth of the heart, Gomperz has hit on a good analysis of the Socratic character. We see it in the last lines of the Symposium, in the words in the prison with Crito, in his conduct in battle, in his discourse with his disciples on the destiny of the soul, and in his many jousts with the Sophists. Touching the Socratic use of induction, Gomperz points out that the word is employed here in a sense different from the meaning it bears in modern times. "Socratic induction, like ours, proceeds by the comparison of individual instances, but its goal is the attainment of a norm, valid, not for nature, but for ideas. Its chief aim is the determination of concepts, that is, definition" (II, p. 55). In other words, Socrates was not concerned with the derivation of a rule regulative of a whole group of facts, but with the establishment of the content of a concept (its definition) by noting the characteristic marks of particular instances.

As to the sources of our information regarding the character and philosophy of Socrates,—Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle,—Gomperz gives Xenophon rather scant courtesy (II, pp. 76, 87, 90). With certain historians this has been the fashion since the time of Schleiermacher, who protested against basing a philosophic estimate of Socrates on the nonphilosophic *Memoirs* of Xenophon. However, in the opinion of the reviewer, while the early dialogues of Plato must always remain our portrait of Socrates the philosopher, the account of Xenophon is hardly less important for the description of Socrates the man and citizen. In regard to the *δαιμόνιον*, Gomperz has no theory to offer, beyond regarding it as a species of instinct or some dim estimate "emerging from the sub-conscious undercurrents of psychic life." The Socratic identification of virtue with knowledge is treated very unsympathetically, and the one-sidedness of this intellectualistic theory of morals emphasized even to exaggeration. It is quite true that Socrates underrated the affective side of consciousness and the motor quality of feeling in conduct, but this is characteristic of almost the whole of Greek philosophy. The Stoic ideal of the passionless sage

is scarcely more than the Socratic doctrine of intellectualism concretely stated. The central idea of the Socratic teaching, viz., that the "unexamined life is not worth living," that good living is right thinking, that sound morality is the morality of sound principles, that the quality of the act is determined by the reasonableness of the motive, is dismissed with a too cursory examination.

One of Gomperz's notable powers is that of historical imagination. He has an extraordinary ability for reconstruction, and has the poet's gift of seeing things concretely. His descriptions are, therefore, often graphic, picturesque, and realistic. When exercised within the limits of authentic details, such an artistic gift for the presentation of verisimilitude is highly useful. When, however, the play of the reconstructive imagination takes on such proportions as are witnessed in the following somewhat characteristic passage, the reader is confronted with the problem of how far literary art is justifiable in the presentation of historical facts. "It was a fine spring morning in the year 399 B. C. The dewdrops glittered brightly, as on other days, in the cups of the anemones, the violets shed their wonted fragrance. But that day's sun was not to reach its meridian height before an unholy deed had been accomplished. It was not a holiday in the legal calendar. Great numbers of Athenians, for the most part aged and of slender means, had risen early that morning. They desired to do service as jurors, for which office they were qualified by their more than thirty years of life, their unspotted record, and the taking of the juror's oath," etc. (II, p. 98). A still more striking example is found in Vol. III, p. 137, where on the banks of the Alpheus the political exile, Dion, and Plato carry on an interesting, but purely fictitious conversation. This type of literary imagination, while perhaps justifiable in a work like Carlyle's *French Revolution*, in a history of philosophy comes dangerously near being inadmissible romance.

With the exception of the chapter on Xenophon, which might be entirely omitted from the work without detriment, the treatment of the minor Socratics is very skilful and instructive. I am unacquainted with any presentation of the doctrines of the Cynics and Megarics that is so good. The Cynic conception of virtue as knowledge *plus* the Socratic strength of will, the revolt against the artificialities of civilization and the gospel of return to nature, the theory of *ἀδιαφορία*, and the political vision of the passing of the city-state into a cosmopolis, are ideas that Gomperz has understood how to expound and illustrate with consummate skill. And here, by the way, I may remark that the translator has performed his work with unusual exactitude in re-

spect of the meaning of the original and with appreciation in respect of the niceties of form. The latter comes particularly to light in the clever, metrical rendering of numerous poetic quotations. For example, Crates of Thebes, in the following hexameter, parodying a passage in the *Odyssey* (referring to the Island of Crete) glorifies the *πήρα* or beggar's wallet of the Cynics, which is symbolic of their mode of living (II, p. 153) :

"Pera, so name we an isle, girt round by the sea of Illusion,
Glorious, fertile, and fair, land unpolluted of evil ;
Here no trafficking knave makes fast his ships in the harbour ;
Here no tempter ensnares the unwary with venal allurements.
Onions and leeks and figs and crusts of bread are its produce.
Never in turmoil of battle do warriors strive to possess it ;
Here there is respite and peace from the struggle for riches and honours."

Gomperz calls cynicism the "philosophy of the Greek proletariat," and aptly compares it with Russianism as exemplified in Tolstoi's *War and Peace* (II, p. 147). He further sees in the fact that the cynics, the "begging friars of philosophy," came from the geographical fringe of Greece, an explanation for their revolt against the civilization of the center and for their "abnormal manifestation of political liberalism" (II, p. 149). The Megarics are characterized as the "ancient Herbartians," because of their similarity of view regarding the problem of predication and judgments of identity (II, p. 177). A detailed analysis of their logical puzzles is a very useful contribution to this chapter in the history of thought.

In his account of the life and philosophy of Plato, which occupies the main portions of Volumes II and III, Gomperz devotes two introductory chapters to Plato's "Years of Study and Travel" and the "Genuineness and Chronology of Plato's Works." The following sixteen chapters are taken up with *résumés* and analyses of the several dialogues, and the last chapter is called "Retrospects and Anticipations." These analyses are not bare summaries of the dialogues, but a restatement of their essential philosophical content accompanied by exposition and illustration. They are incomparably better than the well known *Introductions* of Schleiermacher, which in their time did excellent service for the furtherance of Platonic studies.

When Gomperz says (II, p. 254) that "from the beginning, Plato wrote all his works in the form of dialogue," and that it is "improbable that Plato's career of authorship should have begun early," it might have been well to qualify the statement ; for he is evidently referring exclusively to his philosophical writings. The well

attested tradition that Plato wrote dithyrambic verse, perhaps even a tragedy, before he came to Socrates, is not denied by Gomperz (II, p. 252). He assumes, rightfully I think, that the composition of the dialogues did not begin until after the death of Socrates. Great stress is laid on the travels succeeding 399 as a source of the mathematical, social, and political ideas that are employed in the Platonic works. Particularly Egypt, where, in the opinion of Gomperz, the founder of the Academy spent a considerable period (II, p. 255), made a "profound impression on Plato." The division of labor, hereditary transmission of employments, the sovereignty of the priestly educated caste, the compulsory character of education and the fixity of its content, are ideas discovered in the Nile valley and echoed in the Platonic commonwealth. While there is intrinsic probability in all this, the historical authority on which the statement is based is of very late date (Strabo, Cicero, Augustine, Diogenes Laertius), when the romancing tendency was given free reins.

In regard to the Platonic canon and the chronology of the writings, Gomperz takes a conservative position. He is greatly influenced by that solid old German scholar, the man of "blunt and homely common sense," Karl Friedrich Hermann. He rejects, however, three of the dialogues regarded by Hermann as genuine. Hippias I, Ion, and Alcibiades I. He adopts a tripartite division of the works into (1) a Socratic Period, (2) a Metaphysical Period, and (3) a Period of Mysticism and Political Readjustment. In the first group he places (the order representing approximately the chronological succession) Hippias II, Apology, Laches, Charmides, and Protagoras; in the second group, Gorgias (*cf.* II, pp. 352, 386) Euphyphro, Meno (in these three transitional dialogues, the doctrine of ideas is in inchoation and mingled with Orphic-Pythagorean elements), Symposium (*circa* 384 B. C.), Phædrus, Phædo, Menexenus, Crito, Republic, Euthydemus, Parmenides, Theætetus, Cratylus, Sophist, Statesman, Philebus; in the third group, Timæus, Critias, Laws. One of the striking things about this chronology is the position assigned to the Crito. The ethical refinement displayed in this dialogue, the contrast in political doctrine between it and the Apology, the fact that it is not presupposed by the Phædo, the theory that it is a defense against hypothetical attacks aroused by the political innovations in the early books of the Republic, are considerations that have led Gomperz to push it forward to this extremely late date (III, p. 51). Further, to account for the present position of the Phædrus, which violates the evidence from stylometric criteria, Gomperz has recourse

to the theory that the Phædrus of our canon is a redaction of the original dialogue (III, pp. 29, 328). In other respects the canon and chronology of Gomperz offer nothing radical. Coming as he does from the school of the philologists, Gomperz lays great weight on linguistic statistics ; but it seems to me that he has held the balance justly between the evidences of style and the evidences of content for the determination of the inter-relationship of the dialogues and the order of their composition.

In discussing the Platonic conception of the soul and the doctrine of ideas, Gomperz points out certain interesting affinities between the Greek philosopher and primitive animistic theory. He cites the Indians of Peru, whose views in this connection had been noticed three centuries ago by Father d'Acosta and are quoted by Tylor : " Among the comparatively cultured Peruvians, Acosta describes another theory of celestial archetypes. Speaking of the star-deities, he says that shepherds venerated a certain star called Sheep, another called Tiger protected men from tigers, etc., and generally, of all the animated birds there are on the earth, they believed that a like one lived in heaven, in whose charge were their procreation and increase, . . . so that in a manner it appears that they were drawing towards the dogma of the Platonic ideas " (Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Vol. II, p. 244). What d'Acosta points out in regard to the animism of the Peruvian aborigines, has been paralleled by De Brosses in regard to the Red Indians (*Ibid.*, II, p. 246), *i. e.*, to explain the existence of species, the one and the many, primitive people refer to a common ancestral stock, to an original archetype, to a species-deity, or to a combination of these notions. Their uniformity is explained by unity of origin or by some paradigmatic original, which is the fundamental significance of the Platonic hypostasized idea.

The limits of this review prevent comment on a great variety of interesting matter presented by Gomperz, but I do not wish to lay down these learned, stimulating, and eloquently written volumes without saying that their writer, in a degree true of no other historian, has understood how to take the history of Greek thought out of its isolation, to relate it to the whole culture of the Greeks, and to illuminate it by the civilization of modern times.

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